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INTRODUCTION
ELECTION LAW AT PUBERTY: OPTIMISM
AND WORDS OF CAUTION
Richard L. Hasen*
After reading the rich contributions to this symposium on
"Election Law as Its Own Field of Study," no one can seriously
question whether election law is a subject in its own right, related to
but apart from its very different parents, constitutional law and po-
litical science: res ipsa loquitur.
1
Symposium participants have pointed to some of the indicia
demonstrating that election law stands on its own. It is taught in
many fine law schools;2 it is the exclusive subject of two casebooks;
3
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. B.A., 1986, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley. M.A., 1988, J.D., 1991, Ph.D., Political Science,
1992, University of California, Los Angeles. Thanks to Matthew Gorman for
research assistance.
1. For those political scientists in the reading audience, res ipsa loquitur is
the well-known tort doctrine translated as "the thing speaks for itself." For ex-
ample, suppose that a barrel falls out of a window under defendant's control
injuring plaintiff. That very act proves the defendant's negligence-res ipsa
loquitur-because such incidents usually do not happen in the absence of de-
fendant's negligence. On the doctrine generally, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 39 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.
1998). I use this bit ofjargon deliberately to make a point: those of us writing
for both legal scholars and social scientists should not forget to make ourselves
understandable to both groups.
2. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law, The Political Process, and
the Bondage of Discipline, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1185, 1185 n.3 (1999).
3. See Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist's Per-
spective, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1999); Daniel Ortiz, From Rights
to Arrangements, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1217, 1217 (1999). The first casebook
appeared in 1995. See DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW-CASES AND
MATERIALS (1995). The second casebook appeared in 1998. See SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (1998). Other law school
classes, notably constitutional law and legislation, cover election law subjects,
but with a different focus. For more on this point, see Karlan, supra note 2.
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an Internet-based discussion group for scholars on the subject has
over 150 subscribers;4 and the number of law review articles and
symposia on the subject has mushroomed in the last decade.
5
But perhaps an even better indicator is that the many leading
scholars in the field participating in this symposium have used their
contributions as an opportunity for self-reflection rather than for a
self-congratulatory love fest. The luxury of self-reflection demon-
strates the field's maturity.
The exercise in self-reflection also shows a remarkable degree
of diversity regarding issues facing the field, beginning with its
proper name. I decided to use the term "election law" in this sympo-
sium, following the title of Daniel Lowenstein's casebook.6 Samuel
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, co-authors-along with Pamela
Karlan--of the other casebook in this field, object that the term
"election law" may signal a "tedious focus on the narrow regulatory
questions of most interest to political junkies."7 In their view, the
field is about "taking democracy itself out of the background and
placing it squarely at the center of our inquiries." 8 Not coinciden-
tally, their casebook is entitled "The Law of Democracy."9
4. For more information about the election law listserv see Chicago-Kent,
Election Law (visited Apr. 5, 1999) <http://mlm.kentlaw.edu/election-law>.
5. According to a rough count of law review articles available on Westlaw
conducted by my research assistant, approximately four and a half times the
number of election law-related law review articles and six times the number of
law review symposia on election law topics have appeared since 1990, as com-
pared to the pre-1990 period.
6. Lowenstein explains more about his development of the casebook in
Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election Law as a Subject: A Subjective Account, 32
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1199 (1999). As a matter of full disclosure, I note that I am
now the co-editor with Lowenstein of this book's annual supplement and will
be co-editor of the book's second edition, tentatively due to be published in
2001.
7. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by "Election Law" Alone,
32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1173, 1174 (1999). Lowenstein agrees that "nuts and
bolts" election law questions have increased in number, but "we do not teach
these issues and we do not write about them in law reviews; not because they
are not there but because, for various reasons, we do not find them sufficiently
interesting." Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1202.
8. Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 7, at 1174.
9. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 3.
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Political scientist Bruce Cain observes in his symposium contri-
bution that scholars operating in this field-including Lowenstein
and Karlan-have proposed broader institutional solutions to politi-
cal problems than those dictated by the controversies in election law
cases.10 The question, according to Cain, "is whether the field is
really election law per se or whether it is political regulation."' 1 Fi-
nally, Roy Schotland has perhaps the most descriptive and certainly
among the most amusing of titles for his course in the subject, "Bal-
lots, Bucks, Maps, and the Law."'
12
All of the participants agree about one thing: the study of elec-
tion law serves important pedagogical purposes. Karlan, for exam-
ple, shows how the study of election law can enrich thinking about
constitutional law questions, and vice versa.13  Schotland demon-
strates how election law can, among other things, help students
challenge their preconceptions, partisan viewpoints, and cynicism.
14
And Adam Winkler shows how election law can help us to think
better about corporate law and the nature of the corporation.
15
But there are more points of controversy than consensus among
the scholars. For example, Michael Fitts, a scholar known for draw-
ing on political science insights in his election law writings, 16 argues
that in order for courts to effectively decide election law disputes,
"some type of political black box, a pragmatic and evolving political
process, is ultimately necessary."' 17 Yet James Gardner, a scholar
whose work in the field draws upon various traditions of political
10. See Cain, supra note 3, at 1119.
11. Id.
12. Roy A. Schotland, Andfor the Student? The Seven Striking Strengths of
"Ballots, Bucks, Maps & the Law, " 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1227, 1227 (1999).
13. See Karlan, supra note 2.
14. See Schotland, supra note 12.
15. See Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1243 (1999).
16. See, e.g., Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Per-
spective On Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1567 (1988) (discussing the effect that doctrinal changes advanced by
civic republican writers would have on political power and control).
17. Michael A. Fitts, Confronting the Free Will Problem in Election Law
Scholarship: The Hazards of Legal Fine Tuning, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121,
1134 (1999).
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philosophy, 18 contends that "the black box method is of highly ques-
tionable utility"'19 in addressing normative questions about the role of
elections in American politics.
Of all the areas of disagreement and discussion in these papers, I
am struck most by two divergent views on perhaps the central ques-
tion facing the field: whether the study of election law holds promise
to affect political change in positive ways. Some scholars in the field
have used election law to discover the sometimes hidden political as-
sumptions of judges in deciding election law cases and to propose
political solutions to the legal problems they present.20 Scholars who
have what I will term the "optimistic" view of election law laud this
role for the field, while other scholars-some of whom admittedly
engage in the same practice themselves 21-have what I will term the
"cautionary" view of election law.
Daniel Ortiz, for example, falls into the optimistic camp. His
paper argues that election law has moved us "away from a largely
rights-based, individual-centered view of politics, to a more prag-
matic and structural view of election law as a matter of institutional
18. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Critique of Delibera-
tive Democracy and the Life of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421 (1996) (arguing
that deliberative democracy is largely a failure).
19. James A. Gardner, Stop Me Before I Quantify Again: The Role of Po-
litical Science in the Study of Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1141, 1170
(1999).
20. I would put myself in that category. My recent articles have explored
explicitly how we could structure election law to better promote political
equality through use of campaign finance vouchers, an end to special campaign
finance law treatment for media corporations, compulsory voting laws, and an
end to court protection of the two-party duopoly. See Richard L. Hasen, Cam-
paign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1999) (opposing special campaign finance law treatment for cor-
porate-owned newspapers); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democ-
racy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers,
84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996) (advocating campaign finance vouchers); Richard L.
Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow
the State to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competi-
tion, 1997 SUP. CT. REv. 331 (opposing court protection of the two-party sys-
tem) [hereinafter Hasen, Duopoly]; Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (1996) (advocating compulsory voting).
21. See, e.g., Fitts, supra note 17, at 1137 (discussing how Fitts's own work
on political parties may help "resolve one of the central dilemmas of constitu-
tional law-defining majority will.").
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arrangements. '22 To Ortiz, this is a positive development: "we may
hope that as election law develops as a discipline, it will lead the
courts, and the courts will follow."23  Issacharoff and Pildes are
similarly sanguine about the field's focus: "the central question is
how deep into existing practices a robust, functional, historically-
aware understanding of democracy will penetrate."
24
In contrast, Cain, Fitts, and Gardner suggest greater caution.
Cain suggests that political scientists may have played too strong a
role in-among other cases-the political party cases, "using the
courts to get what cannot be achieved by normal political means. 25
Fitts argues that election law may bring too much transparency to our
political process, thereby undermining the process's public legiti-
macy.26 Gardner argues that political science analysis of election
law issues can create an aura of scientific verifiability, thereby ob-
scuring the fact that normative decisions are for courts or society to
make, not for political scientists.
27
Whether optimism or caution are in order, scholars on both sides
of the divide trace the genesis of the issue to the Warren Court, and
its decision in Baker v. Carr28 to reject Justice Frankfurter's argu-
ment that election law issues like apportionment of legislative dis-
tricts are non-justiciable political questions.29 In the line of cases
following Baker, beginning with Reynolds v. Sims,30 the Supreme
Court held that voting districts must be apportioned according to
one-person, one-vote principles, rather than through an accommoda-
tion of regional interests.
22. Ortiz, supra note 3, at 1218.
23. Id. at 1226.
24. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 7, at 1183.
25. Cain, supra note 3, at 1118.
26. See Fitts, supra note 17.
27. See Gardner, supra note 19, at 1168. This is not the appropriate forum
for me to respond to Professor Gardner's specific critique of my work on com-
pulsory voting. See id. at 1168-70. For present purposes, I will just say that
there is no such thing as bad press, and at least it is bettter to be called a "pa-
thologist," id. at 1170, than "pathological."
28. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
29. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 7, at 1180; Cain, supra note
3, at 1111.
30. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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Following these cases, we now have courts deciding whether a
host of election law practices like political patronage, campaign fi-
nance regulation, ballot access provisions, and congressional term
limits are consistent with various constitutional provisions 3' such as
the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and the Qualifi-
cations Clause.
32
To borrow from Ortiz, where the courts have led, election law
scholars surely have followed. And so scholars have debated the
merits of the Court's election law decisions, beginning with whether
the Court in Reynolds should have imposed strict formal equality in
the creation of electoral districts.33  Similarly, when the Supreme
Court recently declared that states may enact ballot access restric-
tions and other restrictions on third parties in order to protect "a
healthy two-party system, 34 it did not take election law scholars too
long to examine the holding. The more critical scholars declare it a
protection of the Democratic and Republican party "duopoly" 35 or a
political "lock-up.
3 6
The field of election law is driven not only by these court cases,
however. Lowenstein's article demonstrates that it is also driven by
"the evolving interests and styles of legal academics and political
31. Thus far, the Supreme Court has not revisited its pre-Warren Court
precedent that challenges to the initiative process under the Guarantee Clause
are non-justiciable. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118
(1912). This holding also has been subject to criticism by election law schol-
ars. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 3, at 669-75; LOWENSTEIN, supra
note 3, at 284-85.
32. Among the original modem cases on these subjects are: United States
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Qualifications Clause
challenge to a term limits law); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (First
Amendment and Equal Protection challenges to campaign finance regulations);
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (First Amendment challenge to patronage
practices); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (First Amendment chal-
lenges to ballot access laws).
33. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3, at 1110-11 (discussing the Reynolds's un-
intended consequence of preventing metropolitan traffic control plan in the San
Francisco Bay Area).
34. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 367 (1997).
35. Hasen, Duopoly, supra note 20, at 332.
36. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 683-87 (1998).
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scientists. 37 Does that mean that academics are too dangerous to be
trusted with election law scholarship?
As dangerous as it might be to have law professors and political
scientists debating the merits of election law judicial decisions, the
two alternatives are worse. One alternative is to push the cautionary
view to its logical limit, and say that election law issues involve
normative decisions to be made by courts without second-guessing
by scholars. A second alternative is to return to an era when these
questions were non-justiciable, in effect leaving these questions to
the outcome of political struggles in the legislative and executive
branches.
Neither of these alternatives is politically realistic or norma-
tively palatable. Consider the first alternative, abandoning the criti-
cal enterprise of election law. As bad as scholars may be at discern-
ing how election laws affect political outcomes, it is hard to believe
that most judges would make better decisions on these issues in a
vacuum. In fact, judges often rely upon their unstated understanding
of political science in making their decisions, as the Supreme Court
apparently did in its recent decision that political stability could be
enhanced by a healthy two-party system.3 8 It is better that election
law scholars explore those assumptions and make them transparent
to judges who will revisit these issues at a later time.
Nor is a return to non-justiciability of election law issues likely
or desirable.39 Baker let the genie out of the bottle, or to use another
legal metaphor, after Baker we are no longer in a position to unring
the bell. What would happen to our democratic process if courts
were to declare that they would no longer adjudicate a claim that a
legislature passed a statute keeping a political party off the ballot
because the members of the legislature do not want political
37. Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1211.
38. See Hasen, Duopoly, supra note 20, at 332 (noting that the Supreme
Court decision in Timmons "seems to reflect an uncritical reliance on a sub-
stantial normative political science literature, the 'responsible party govern-
ment' position, that argues for protection of the two-party system").
39. Only Justice Thomas in recent years has suggested a return to non-
justiciability of election law issues. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 913
(1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We would be mighty Platonic guardians in-
deed if Congress had granted us the authority to determine the best form of lo-
cal government for every county, city, village, and town in America.").
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competition? 40  What if the courts would no longer adjudicate
whether a school board could decide to exclude some adult citizen
residents from voting in school board elections on grounds that they
did not have enough of a stake or interest in the election?41 Or, what
if the courts would no longer adjudicate whether a public employee
working for the sheriffs department may be fired because the em-
ployee is a Republican and the new sheriff is a Democrat?
42
We would be worse off in a system without judicial review of
election law cases even if a court would have decided most of these
cases against the complaining party: "getting one's day in court" is
part of the remedy itself. But in any case, election law scholars then
would bring their analyses to bear on the political branches of gov-
ernment, especially to the people in those states with an initiative
process. Whether the political process would self-correct some of its
greater abuses is an open question, but election law scholarship
would remain a necessary component in any self-correction.
Consequently, no matter what happens, election law scholars do
not need to look for another line of work. Already there are predic-
tions of a litigation explosion following the next round of redistrict-
ing after the 2000 census.43 Other issues, such as campaign finance
and term limits, continue to be hotly debated in the courts, legisla-
tures, and by the people through the initiative process.
44
The cautionary words of some symposium participants are
worth heeding, but only up to a point. To the extent that courts con-
sider the arguments of election law scholars-even scholars urging
caution4 -we have a responsibility to recognize the limitations in
40. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 34.
41. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
42. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 347.
43. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment after the
2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REv. 731, 731 (1998).
44. For a look at the current issues facing courts in the election law area,
see DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: 1998-99
SUPPLEMENT (1998).
45. Justice Scalia, for example, cited Professor Fitts's work in arguing that
patronage practices should be upheld as constitutional because the practice ar-
guably helps the two-party system. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Michael A. Fitts, The
Vices of Virtue: A Political Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legis-
lative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1603-07 (1998)).
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our ability both to accurately predict the outcome of election law
changes and to provide normative justifications for one or another
view of the law.
But I remain in the optimists' camp, believing that the field-
whatever we should call it---can be especially useful in fulfilling the
Warren Court's promise of greater political equality. Caution can be
especially dangerous in promoting inertia and discouraging innova-
tion. Caution in election law scholarship counsels against thinking
creatively and counter-intuitively about subjects central to the func-
tioning and fairness of the American polity.
I propose that we reconvene this symposium in ten years to see
how election law has progressed from puberty to adulthood-and
perhaps to see how we have progressed to middle age and beyond, as
well. Let's throw caution to the wind.
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